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Research indicates that evaluated people form positively biased
impressions of their evaluators (eg., Pepitone, 1950; Stevens 8c Fiske, 1995). It
has been hypothesized that the extreme control deprivation associated with
evaluation leads to positive impressions, even in face of contrary evidence, for
two reasons: (1) accuracy and individuation are viewed as less useful strategies,
and (2) positive expectancies protect threatened self-esteem (Stevens 8c Fiske,
1995). An experiment was performed in order to investigate these hypotheses
as well as two potential mediators (self-esteem threat and anxiety) and two
potential moderators (trait self-esteem and relationship orientation) of positively
biased impressions. Regarding the mediators, it was hypothesized that: (1) as
self-esteem threat increased, impressions would become more biased, and (2) as
anxiety increased, impressions would become more categorical. Turning to the
moderators, it was hypothesized that: (1) high trait self-esteem participants
would be biased to perceive a competent evaluator who would recognize their
good performance, while low trait self-esteem participants would be biased to
perceive an incompetent evaluator whose evaluation would be easy to discount.
VI
and (2) relations-oriented (high LPC) participants would believe their
relationship with the evaluator was threatened by the impending evaluation
and would be more positively biased than task-oriented (low LPC) participants.
A non-dependent control group was included for comparison purposes. The
study did replicate previous research (Stevens & Fiske, 1995) and demonstrated
that evaluated people do use positively biased strategies to form impressions of
their evaluators. However, the roles of the potential mediators and moderators
were less clear. Discussion of the results concludes with the proposal of a
potentially clarifying study.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
A [person] is such a complex fact.... Whichever one of these aspects of
its being I temporarily class [a thing] under, makes me unjust to the
other aspects. But as I always am classing it under one aspect or
another, I am always unjust, always partial, always exclusive. My
excuse is necessity-the necessity which my finite and practical nature
lays upon me. My thinking is first and last and always for the sake of
my doing, and I can only do one thing at a time. (James, 1890/1983,
pp. 959-60)
People have goals that depend on other people, and, as James reminds
us, these goals may bias perception. Yet, initially, modern social cognitive
psychologists focused on cognition to the neglect of goals and motivation.
However, recently, social cognitive theorists have returned to their roots.
Social perceivers now are viewed as motivated tacticians who consider their
social interaction goals before choosing cognitive strategies (Fiske & Taylor,
1991; Fiske, 1993; Forgas, 1992; Hilton & Darley, 1991; Kunda, 1987; Klein &
Kunda, 1992).
Even within the motivated tactician perspective, however, the bulk of
social cognitive research has examined mainly two types of goals: (1)
accuracy-oriented goals, which promote individuated, detailed (but not
necessarily accurate) impressions, and (2) expectancy-confirming goals, which
promote quick, good-enough (but not necessarily inaccurate) impressions (for
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a review, see Fiske, 1993). But, many goals may have little to do with
attempting to form accurate or expectancy-confirming impressions. Goals can
lead to specific, directional biases in person perception.
Evaluation and Person Perception
Whether one’s aim is to earn a loan or to earn a doctorate, reaching a
goal often depends on the good-will of at least temporarily powerful
evaluators. The powerless, evaluated members of such asymmetrical power
relationships, in which evaluators have complete control over the outcomes,
are motivated to navigate their evaluation successfully in order to reach their
goal. One way to cope with the potentially threatening nature of an
upcoming evaluation is to believe truly in the good-will of the evaluator, to
engage in wishful thinking.
In fact, evaluated people do form positively biased perceptions of their
evaluators. As early as 1950, Pepitone found evidence of distortions in a
positive direction. People, who were dependent on a group of three
evaluators, overestimated how much the most negative evaluator liked them
and underestimated how much influence this person had on group decisions.
More recent research also indicates that evaluated people positively reframe
their evaluator and engage in wishful thinking (Stevens & Fiske, 1995).
Compared to people who were not evaluated, people who were evaluated
spent most of their time on any negative information that was available,
discounted this negative information, and formed a positively biased
impression of the powerful evaluator.
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Positive biases in person perception also occur under a different
evaluative social structure: initial romantic interdependence. People seeking
romantic relationships are evaluated by others who decide whether to accept
or reject them as potential partners. Indeed, researchers have found that
perceivers think positively about a potential date (Berscheid, Graziano,
Monson, & Dermer, 1976; Stephan, Berscheid, & Walster, 1971). In one
recent set of studies, people who expected to date someone, compared to those
who did not, viewed their potential date as competent even when the person
was not. Incompetent targets were judged just as favorably as competent
ones (Fiske, Goodwin, Rosen, & Rosenthal, 1994).
Existing Explanations for Positive Biases
Some attempts have been made to explain these positive, directional
biases in person perception. Early researchers simply argued that people who
are dependent on another person tend to arrive at wish-fulfilling conclusions
about the person’s dispositions (Berscheid et al, 1976; Pepitone, 1950;
Stephan et al., 1971). However, pure task outcome dependency, simply being
dependent on another person in the absence of evaluation (e.g., as
teammates), does not result in positive biases (Erber & Fiske, 1984; Neuberg
& Fiske, 1987; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990).
More recently, Stevens and Fiske (1995) hypothesized that evaluated
people form positive impressions of their evaluators (and potential romantic
partners), even in face of contrary evidence, for two reasons: (1) evaluated
perceivers neglect accuracy and individuation as less useful strategies , and (2)
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evaluated perceivers attempt to protect threatened self-esteem with positive
expectancies .
First, with regard to the utility of accuracy and individuating
strategies, normally, when people are outcome dependent, they individuate
the other person in order to increase their sense of prediction and control
(Erber & Fiske, 1984; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990; Stevens
& Fiske, 1995). However, these accuracy-motivated strategies occur only in
pure task-oriented situations, perhaps because these outcome dependent
people feel that they have some potential personal control; they will perform
some of the work.
In contrast, evaluativelv dependent people may perceive fewer
opportunities personally to control their outcomes. Even if evaluatively
dependent people do perform well, it may not matter; the powerful evaluator
makes ^ the decisions. So, evaluatively dependent people may give up on
accuracy and individuation as useless strategies. In fact, a recent study by
Copeland (1994) revealed that evaluatively dependent people in dyads were
less motivated to learn about their partner than were the powerful people.
Second, with regard to the protective nature of positive expectancies,
evaluation not only provides feedback about performance on a task, but also
provides information regarding the evaluated person’s inherent worth. Thus,
the powerful person’s evaluation potentially threatens the perceiver’s self-
esteem. People may connect their evaluation to their self-view, which lasts
well beyond the immediate setting; a single small task outcome does not
typically have the same kind of lasting effects. Thus, evaluated people may
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feel that a competent evaluator Is most likely to evaluate them fairly and,
therefore, favorably. As a result, people’s perceptions of their evaluators may
be positively biased.
Thus, theoretically, people’s positively biased perceptions of evaluators
are affected by both the extreme loss of control and the threat associated with
evaluation. However, no data directly address how control deprivation and
self-esteem threat operate together.
Control and Self-Esteem
Control deprivation is linked to self-esteem. Loss of control does more
than simply motivate people to regain control. Control loss signals a threat;
it suggests a shortcoming in people’s abilities to cope with a demanding
environment (Strube & Yost, 1993).
In fact, the self-esteem maintenance hypothesis posits that low control
threatens people’s self-esteem (Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Abramson & Alloy,
1980). One way people cope with this threat is to overestimate their control
over subsequent positive outcomes. Thus, the protection of threatened self-
esteem may partially determine people’s judgments of control (for a review,
see Alloy, Clements, & Koenig, 1993).
According to self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988), control deprivation
activates a simple self-affirmation motive, a motive to affirm an image of
competency and ability to control outcomes. Under threat, a self-affirmation
motive may, for example, increase self-serving attributions that protect or
enhance the self Externalizing the causes of poor performance and
internalizing the causes of good performance are examples of such self-serving
5
attributions (Jones & Berglas, 1978; Weary & Arkin, 1981; Weiner, 1985).
Other strategies, such as attributing positive characteristics to an evaluator,
are also self-protecting and self-serving (Stevens & Fiske, 1995).
Self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) further argues that simply
explaining an event may imply knowledge and competency (cf., Pittman &
Heller, 1987). Consequently, a self-affirmation motive could increase
attributions about events unrelated to the self or to the threat (e.g., Steele,
1975, 1988; Steele, & Lui, 1981; Steele & Lui, 1983). In other words, the self-
affirmation motive aroused by control deprivation can be assuaged by self-
affirmation on dimensions unrelated to the threat or by attributions about
others unconnected to the self. In fact, while control-deprived people
normally make more attributions than non-control-deprived people (Lui &
Steele, 1986; Pittman & D’Agostino, 1989; Pittman & Pittman, 1980), the
attributions of control-deprived people given the opportunity to engage in self-
affirmation on a value dimension important to the self, but unrelated to the
control-deprivation experience, do not differ from non-control-deprived people
(Lui & Steele, 1986).
It is important to note that all of the research on self-affirmation
increasing attributions about others was conducted in non-evaluative
situations. In fact, consistent with self-affirmation theory, outcome dependent
people who are not evaluated by a powerful other do increase their
attributional activity about the powerful other. These attributions are
accuracy-oriented and individuate the powerful other, but they are not self-
protective or self-serving (Stevens & Fiske, 1995).
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However, the evaluative nature of most power relationships may
overwhelm people’s ability to self-affirm by way of unrelated attributions.
Instead, the extreme self-esteem threat associated with such a great loss of
control may force evaluatively dependent powerless people to resort to more
direct self-protective and self-serving attributions, such as forming positively
biased impressions of the evaluator.
Self-Esteem and Control: Links to Anxiety
At a minimum, as well as being linked to control deprivation, we know
that threatened self-esteem is clearly related to anxiety. Anxiety and anxiety-
related problems are correlated negatively with self-esteem (e.g., French,
1968, Lipsitt, 1958; Rosenberg & Simmons, 1972), self-report and
physiological indexes indicate that threats to self-esteem produce anxiety (e.g.,
Bennett & Holmes, 1975; Burish & Houston, 1979), and the defense of self-
esteem reduces anxiety (e.g., Bennett & Holmes, 1975; Hakmiller, 1966;
Mehlman & Snyder, 1985). In addition, proponents of terror management
theory, for example, argue that self-esteem provides protection against anxiety
in response to threat (Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, Rosenblatt, Burling,
Lyon, Simon, & Pinel, 1992). Apparently, self-esteem is important not only
for feelings of control; it is also an important piece of managing anxiety.
Protecting self-esteem appears to be an effective way to reduce anxiety.
Furthermore, the control deprivation associated with outcome
dependency also leads to anxiety. People whose outcomes are controlled by
powerful outgroup members report feeling that their outcomes are less under
their own control than people whose outcomes are controlled by ingroup
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members (D6pret, 1994). In addition, people controlled by outgroup members
reported feeling more jittery, unhappy, and angry, and less calm and happy
than people controlled by ingroup members (Depret, 1994).
These anxious people want to regain control. However, anxiety
generates a simultaneous capacity decrement and heightened control
motivation, which both result from intrusive thoughts. While anxious people
want to regain control, their capacity decrement takes away the needed
resources (Fiske & Emery, 1993). Thus, anxious people may compensate by
trying to control others. Furthermore, the depleted cognitive resources may
lead to stereotyped thinking (Wilder & Shapiro, 1989a; 1989b). Categorized
people may appear simpler and easier to control than individuated people.
Preliminary experimental and correlational evidence (Fiske & Morling, in
press) supports these hypotheses.
In fact, the impressions that outcome dependent people form of their
evaluators are categorically positive compared to the impressions of non-
evaluatively outcome dependent and baseline people (Stevens & Fiske, 1995).
These categorically positive impressions may result from the anxiety
experienced by the evaluatively dependent powerless people.
Mediation
According to the above reasoning, the control deprivation associated
with being evaluatively outcome dependent not only leads to threatened self-
esteem, but it also leads to anxiety. In turn, this self-esteem threat may cause
evaluatively dependent people to resort to self-protective attributions,
positively biased impressions of the evaluator. In addition, the anxiety related
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to being evaluatively dependent may cause these impressions of the evaluator
to be categorically positive. In other words, threatened self-esteem and
feelings of anxiety should mediate the effect control deprivation has on
people’s perceptions of their evaluator (see Figure 1).
However, being evaluated may not affect all people equally. Some
people may become extremely threatened and anxious upon learning of an
impending evaluation. These people may protect themselves with a different
kind of biased impression of their evaluator. Alternatively, some people may
not be very threatened by an evaluative relationship. These people’s
impressions of their evaluator may not be biased. In other words, personality
characteristics may moderate the positively biased perceptions associated with
being evaluated. Two moderators that may affect these processes are trait
self-esteem and relationship orientation.
Trait Self-Esteem
If the threat associated with evaluation is perceived in the same way by
all people, regardless of their trait self-esteem, then everyone should be biased
in the same way. All evaluatively dependent people should form positively
biased impressions of their evaluators. However, it is possible that trait self-
esteem or long-term feelings of competency could affect people’s biases.
In the aforementioned Stevens and Fiske study (1995), on which the
current theoretical reasoning is based, the powerless people were specifically
led to believe they would perform well on the task. Therefore, they may have
desired a competent evaluator who would be likely to evaluate them fairly and
favorably. However, if the possibility of failure had been salient, powerless
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people may have preferred a different kind of evaluator, an incompetent
evaluator. A negative evaluation from a competent evaluator would be
difficult to Ignore, but a negative evaluation from an incompetent evaluator is
easy to discount. Thus, people with high self-esteem or a belief that they will
be successful on the task may prefer a competent evaluator; to protect their
self-esteem they may have positive illusions similar to those found in the
research reviewed earlier. However, people with low self-esteem or a belief
that they will not be successful on the task may prefer an incompetent
evaluator, to protect their self-esteem they may have negative illusions about
the evaluator (i.e., they can discount a negative evaluation if it comes from an
incompetent evaluator).
Therefore, the self-protective strategies employed by evaluatively
dependent people may be moderated by trait self-esteem (as well as long-term
competence). People with high self-esteem may expect to do well in the study,
experience less threat, and desire a competent evaluator. On the other hand,
people with low self-esteem may expect to do poorly in the study, experience
great threat, and desire an incompetent evaluator.
Relationship Orientation
Similarly, the manner in which evaluatively dependent perceivers
approach relationships also may moderate their perceptions of evaluators.
Most research on power assumes a traditional, individualistic, and task-
oriented relationship. However, some types of power are more caretaking,
attentive, and relationship-oriented. Evaluatively dependent perceivers who
approach their asymmetrical power relationship with an evaluator in a task-
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oriented manner may react differently to their impending evaluation than
those who approach their power relationship in a more relationship-oriented
fashion.
Perhaps the most well known model of these individual differences is
Fiedler’s contingency theory of leadership (Fiedler, 1964; 1967; 1978; Fiedler
& Garcia, 1987). This work contrasts task-oriented leaders (powerful people),
who think poorly of their least preferred coworker (LPC), and relations-
oriented leaders (powerful people), who think less poorly of their LPC.
People who are attuned to the relationship between the powerful person and
dependent person may be more concerned about interpersonal aspects than
task-related aspects of the relationship. Thus, high LPC (relations-oriented)
people should be particularly concerned with maintaining a positive
relationship. There is evidence that follower satisfaction increases linearly
with leader LPC score (Rice, 1981). High LPC followers should also strive to
maintain a positive relationship with their leaders and may be motivated to
perceive the powerful in a positive manner.
On the other hand, people who focus on task-related aspects of the
relationship between the powerful person and the dependent person may be
more sensitive to issues such as task-competency than to interpersonal issues.
Thus, low LPC (task-oriented) people should be particularly concerned with
maintaining a productive task association. Low LPC followers should be
driven to size up their superiors and may be motivated to perceive powerful
people with particular regard to their task-competency. These low LPC
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followers may process competency-related information about an evaluator
accurately and individuate.
Therefore, the self-protective impression formation strategies employed
by evaluatively dependent people may be moderated by their relationship
orientation. The threat of evaluation may particularly worry relations-
oriented people, who want to maintain positive associations with their
evaluator, and the threat may lead high LPC followers to form positively
biased impressions of their evaluator. On the other hand, the threat of
evaluation may not bother task-oriented people, who want to maintain a
productive task relationship with their evaluator, and low LPC followers may
form accurate, competency-based impressions of their evaluator.
Summary and Predictions
In sum, evaluatively dependent people have lost control over their own
outcomes without retaining control over the powerful person. This control
deprivation, paired with the forthcoming evaluation, threatens evaluatively
dependent people’s self-esteem and produces anxiety. Self-esteem threat
triggers self-affirmation that results in self-protective and self-serving
attributions about the evaluator: The evaluator will be viewed positively (at
least before the actual interaction). Anxiety may cause these impressions of
the evaluator to be categorically positive. Thus, (Hypothesis 1) self-esteem
threat and anxiety mediate the path from control deprivation to biased
impressions.
Furthermore, the evaluatively dependent person’s trait self-esteem and
relationship orientation may moderate these effects. (Hypothesis 2) People
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with high self-esteem may be less threatened by the situation and may be
motivated to view the evaluator as a competent person who will recognize
their good performance, while people with low self-esteem may be more
threatened by the situation and may be motivated to view the evaluator as an
incompetent person whose evaluation will be easy to discount. (Hypothesis 3)
In addition, relations-oriented (high LPC) people may believe their
relationship with the evaluator is threatened by the impending evaluation,
and they may be motivated to view the evaluator as positive; alternatively,
task-oriented (low LPC) people may be less threatened by the evaluation, and
they may be motivated to accurately perceive the competency of the evaluator.
13
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Figure
1.
Model
of
Mediation
CHAPTER 2
EXPERIMENT
The experiment investigates two potential mediators (self-esteem threat
and anxiety) and two potential moderators (trait self-esteem and relationship
orientation) of the directionally biased impressions evaluatively dependent
people form of their evaluators. Regarding the mediators, as self-esteem
threat increases, impressions should become more biased. And, as anxiety
increases, impressions should become more categorical. Turning to the
moderators, high trait self-esteem participants may be biased to perceive a
competent evaluator, while low trait self-esteem participants may be biased to
perceive an incompetent evaluator. And relations-oriented (high LPC)
participants’ relationships may be more threatened (and therefore more
biased) than task-oriented (low LPC) participants’ relationships. A non-
dependent control group is included for comparison purposes.
Method
Overview
An experimenter led participants to believe that their performance
would (evaluative dependency) or would not (no dependency) be evaluated by
a fictitious other, whom they expected to meet. In addition, the experimenter
told participants they would be eligible for a prize based on the evaluation of
their performance (no dependency subjects were also told they would be
evaluated, but not by the fictitious other). The fictitious other was initially
portrayed as competent (positive expectation) or incompetent (negative
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expectation). Participants then received both positive and negative
(expectancy-consistent and expectancy-inconsistent) information about the
fictitious participant and voiced their reactions to that information into a tape
recorder. This created a three-way design with two between-participants
variables (dependency and expectation) and one within-participant variable
(information valence). In addition, participants’ trait self-esteem and
relationship orientation scores were available from a prescreening session.
Participants
One hundred seventeen (82 females and 35 males) introductory
psychology students from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst
received extra credit for their participation. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of the four conditions created by the between-participants
variables of dependency and expectation. The data of two participants who
volunteered suspicion about the alleged other participant, one participant who
understood English poorly, and one participant who was more than two and a
half standard deviations above the mean on the critical variable of attention
time were deleted from the analyses. In addition, two participants were
deleted due to experimenter error.^ Any other omissions were due to missing
data. This left 111 participants, 27-29 in each cell of the critical two-way
interaction between dependency (a between-participants variable) and
information valence (the within-participants variable). Positivity of
expectancy was included as a counterbalancing variable to unconfound valence
and consistency of the information received.
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Procedurft
Prior to the experimental session, at the beginning of the semester,
participants completed a prescreening questionnaire. Included in this
questionnaire were the Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965; see Appendix A)
and the Least-Preferred Coworker Scale (Fiedler, 1967; see Appendix B).
Immediately upon arrival at the experimental session, participants were
asked to fill out a version of the Self-Esteem Scale, modified to measure state
self-esteem (see Appendix C). After they completed this questionnaire, the
experimenter explained that a work-study undergraduate also would be
participating in the study. This alleged person, always the same sex as the
participant, was waiting in another room. There were several wind-up toys,
paper, pens, and pencils on the table that presumably would be used for the
task.
The experimenter briefly explained that the researchers were
supposedly investigating how discussion affects performance on a creative
task. So, later in the study, the experimenter would ask them to think up
educational games for children using the wind-up toys. For example,
subtraction could be shown by winding up a toy and letting it hop away from
the remaining toys. While explaining the task, the experimenter indicated
that skill and creativity would be helpful. Supposedly, the experimenter
would be comparing the performance of two groups of subjects-one group of
people who discussed their ideas and another group of people who did not
discuss their ideas.
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The experimenter then informed participants that they happened to be
m the condition of the study in which they would have the discussion with
the fictitious work-study person. In fact, all participants were in this
"condition."
The experimenter proceeded to inform participants that, as extra
incentive, they would have an opportunity to earn some money. In the no-
dependency condition, a research supervisor would be awarding the prizes. In
the evaluative dependency condition, the fictitious work-study person with
whom the participants would be discussing their ideas would be awarding the
prizes. These were $50 prizes. Participants signed a form indicating that
they understood how the prizes would be awarded. In an effort to make the
evaluation more salient, participants were also told that they would receive
their evaluation at the end of the hour before they left.
The experimenter then told participants that, in an effort to make the
study more like a real-life work situation, they would be receiving some
information about the person with whom they would be discussing their ideas.
The first piece of information was a brief statement written by the other
person explaining how well this person expected to do in the discussion. This
statement served to manipulate participants’ expectancy for the work-study
person. The competent expectancy statement read: "To be honest, I think I
might be pretty good at this. I’ve been a teaching assistant for several
semesters now and I’ve done pretty well, especially with things like this."
The incompetent expectancy statement read: "To be honest. I’m not sure if
I’ll be any good at this. I was a teaching assistant last semester, but I didn’t
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do so great, especially with things like this." Participants looked over this
statement while the experimenter walked down the hall, allegedly to see if the
work-study person was about ready to begin.
After returning, the experimenter asked participants to go through
some additional information. This trait information was supposedly taken
from an informal evaluation of the work-study person when that person was a
teaching assistant. The experimenter told the participants that their initial
reactions to this information was of interest to the researchers, who thus
would like to record their reactions on an audiotape. After reassuring
participants of the anonymity of their responses, especially with respect to the
fictitious other person, the experimenter asked participants to read each piece
of information aloud and to comment about it.
This information was mixed. The five positive sentences used the
adjectives: clever, persistent, quick, efficient, and relaxed. The five negative
sentences used the adjectives: irresponsible, vague, superficial, nitpicking, and
sloppy. These statements were identical to those used in previous research
(Stevens & Fiske, 1995) and are available in Appendix D. The sentences
appeared in a different random order for each participant, with the
stipulation that no more than two positive or two negative statements
appeared consecutively.
When participants finished commenting on the information about the
work-study person, they were asked to complete three questionnaires. These
questionnaires were arranged in order to capture the less persistent effects
first. The first questionnaire utilized Epstein’s Emotion Triads (see Appendix
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E) to measure mood, especially anxiety. The second questionnaire contained
the State Self-Esteem Scale used at the beginning of the experiment
embedded in the Feelings of Inadequacy Scale^ (Janis & Field, 1959; see
Appendix F). Finally, the third questionnaire (see Appendix G) asked
participants to rate how well the work-study person would do on the task and
how much control the work-study person had over their outcomes. In
addition, participants indicated their own competency at the task, their
perceived control, and how happy they were with the work-study person.
Participants also rated the consistency, clarity, and positivity of their
impression of the work-study person. The questionnaire also asked
participants how helpful the information about work-study person was and
how much information they would like if they were participating again. In
order to examine tlie positivity of impressions, participants were asked to rate
the work-study person on a variety of traits. In addition, as a manipulation
check, participants were asked to indicate who would be judging their
performance. A second part of the questionnaire asked participants to recall
the purpose of the experiment and comment on the study thus far.^ Once
this questionnaire was completed, the experimenter probed participants for
suspicion and debriefed them. A random drawing for the $50 prizes was held
when the study was completed.
Data from protocols . From the audiotapes, the experimenter, who was
blind to condition, recorded the number of seconds participants considered the
positive and negative information. Timing always commenced when
participants began to read each statement. Participants’ tape-recorded
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comments were then coded into discrete categories (see Table 1) used in prior
research (see Stevens & Fiske, 1995). In addition, each of the comments was
also classified as discounting or not. To assess reliability of both coding
schemes, another individual, who was also blind to condition, coded a random
third of the protocols. Cohen s kappa coefficients were computed for each
code type and are as follows: dispositions, k =
.89; elaboration, k = .84;
evaluations, k =
.87; hedging, k =
.98; attribute matching, k = .86;
repetitions, k =
.91; self-reference, k =
.80; no comment, k = 1.00; and
discounting, k = .94 (median k = .89).
Scales
Self-Esteem Scale (Trait) . People’s scores on the Self-Esteem Scale
(SES) are related to many self-esteem-related constructs. For example, Lorr
and Wunderlich (1986) reported a correlation of .65 between SES scores and
confidence and a correlation of .39 between SES and popularity. Reynolds
(1988) found a correlation of .38 between SES scores and overall academic
self-concept. In addition, Fleming and Courtney (1984) demonstrated that
SES scores correlated .78 with general self-regard, .51 with social confidence,
and .35 with school abilities. A Cronbach a of .90 was obtained for the fall
1994 University of Massachusetts at Amherst prescreening sample and a
Cronbach a of .90 was also obtained for the spring 1995 sample.
Least-Preferred Coworker Scale . People’s scores of the Least-Preferred
Coworker Scale (LPC) are associated with many relationship orientation
concepts. For instance, Meuwese (1964) found that high LPC people are more
considerate and that members of groups with high LPC leaders tend to be
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lower in anxiety, get along better, and are more satisfied. Hawkins (1962)
reported that low LPC people are more task-oriented than relationship-
oriented and more punitive toward poor coworkers. Meuwese (1964) found
that low LPC people are more efficient and goal-oriented. Finally, Bishop
(1964) indicated that high LPC people derive their major satisfaction from
successful interpersonal relationships while low LPC people derive their major
satisfaction from task performance. A Cronbach a of .95 was obtained for the
fall 1994 University of Massachusetts at Amherst prescreening sample and a
Cronback a of .94 was obtained for the spring 1995 sample.
Epstein's Emotion Triads
. This scale was designed to measure people’s
current emotional state (Epstein, 1979). The clusters of three adjectives were
determined by factor analysis of adjective checklists (e.g., Epstein, 1976). In
this experiment, we were interested particularly in a triad measuring anxiety.
Morling and Fiske (1994) reported that high trait anxiety is related to high
scores on the jittery-shaky-nervous triad. Thus, the jittery-shaky-nervous
triad was used as our measure of state anxiety.
State Self-Esteem Scales . Because these scales have not been used
widely in research, independent validity information is not available.
However, using participants in this experiment, a Cronbach a of .89 was
obtained for the first State Self-Esteem Scale and a Cronbach a of .88 was
obtained for the second State Self-Esteem Scale.
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Results
Manipulation Checks
A measure of participants’ perceptions of how well the fictitious other
was expected to do in the discussion indicated that the expectancy
manipulation operated as designed. Participants in the positive expectancy
condition expected the other person to do better in the discussion (M = 9.25)
than did participants in the negative expectancy condition (M = 3.79),
F(l,107) = 238.74, MSE = 3.50, p < .0001.“* This accurately reflects the
information these participants were given.
In addition, significantly more participants than would be expected by
chance correctly answered the questionnaire item asking who would be
judging their performance, t(llO) = 8.21, SE = 5.24, p < .001. Therefore,
most of the participants understood whom they were told would be judging
their performance.
Contrary to previous research (Stevens & Fiske, 1995), there was not a
main effect for dependency on the measure of how much control the other
person had over whether the participant won the prize. Participants who
were not dependent did not differ from those who where evaluatively
dependent. The item measuring the other person’s control was on the final
questionnaire and several new scales were added to the study prior to this
final questionnaire. These new scales may have affected measures on the
final questionnaire. This possibility will be addressed in the discussion.
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Timed Attention
The total number of seconds participants attended to positive and
negative attribute information was entered into a 2 X 2 X 2 mixed model
analysis of variance (ANOVA) on Dependency (none, evaluative) X
Expectation (positive, negative) X Information Valence (positive, negative).
This analysis yielded two main effects. Participants in the evaluative
condition spent more time on the trait information (M = 148.77 seconds) than
participants in the no dependency condition (M = 127.76), F(l,106) = 8.12,
MSE = 744.59, p < .01. This effect has been found in previous research
(Stevens & Fiske, 1995) and may indicate that evaluatively dependent
participants require more time than other participants in order to discount
some of the trait information. In addition, all participants spent more time
on negative trait information (M = 74.65 seconds) than positive trait
information (M = 63.61), F(l,106) = 46.24, MSE = 145.90, p < .0001.^ This
is not unusual. A great deal of person perception research has indicated that,
in general, negative information is considered more informative than positive
information (see Skowronski & Carlston, 1989).
Mediators
Self-Esteem Threat . Self-esteem threat was operationalized as the
difference between each participant’s state self-esteem score at the beginning
of the experimental session (State Self-Esteem Scale) and each participant’s
state self-esteem score after the think-aloud protocol (State Self-Esteem Scale
within Feelings of Inadequacy Scale).® These two state self-esteem measures
used different response scales and, therefore, could not be compared directly
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to one another. Thus, the each state self-esteem score was converted to a z-
score. Self-esteem threat was computed by subtracting the second measure
from the first. Therefore, threat would be indicated by a negative difference
score.
This difference score was entered into a 2 X 2 ANOVA, using
Dependency (none, evaluative) and Expectation (positive, negative) as the
independent variables. It was hypothesized that participants expecting
evaluation would be more threatened by the evaluation than other
participants. However, there was no main effect for outcome dependency
condition.
In addition, self-esteem threat was hypothesized to predict the degree
of bias in participants’ impressions of the evaluator. Thus, the total number^
of discounting comments made by participants was regressed on this
difference score. This regression was not significant.
State Anxiety. State anxiety was operationalized as each participant’s
score on the jittery-shaky-nervous triad of Epstein’s Emotion Triads. This
score was entered into a 2 X 2 ANOVA, using Dependency (none, evaluative)
and Expectation (positive, negative) as the independent variables. It was
hypothesized that participants expecting evaluation would be more anxious
than other participants. However, there was no main effect for outcome
dependency condition.
Furthermore, state anxiety was hypothesized to predict the degree of
bias in participants’ impressions of the evaluator. Thus, the total number of
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discounting comments made by participants was regressed on this difference
score. This regression was not significant.
Moderators^
Trait Self-Esteem
. It was predicted that low self-esteem participants
would be more threatened by the evaluation than high self-esteem
participants. In order to investigate this hypothesis, a median split was
performed on the Self-Esteem Scale, and a 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA» was conducted
on the self-esteem threat variable, using Dependency (none,evaluative).
Expectation (positive, negative, and Scale Score (bottom half, top half) as the
independent variables. This analysis did not yield the predicted effect.
It also was predicted that low self-esteem participants would be more
negatively biased in their perceptions of the evaluator’s traits than high self-
esteem participants. In order to investigate this hypotheses, a median split
was performed on the Self-Esteem Scale, and 2X2X2 ANOVAs were
conducted on the trait measures, using Dependency (none,evaluative).
Expectation (positive, negative, and Scale Score (bottom half, top half) as the
independent variables. None of these analyses yielded the predicted effect.
Relationship Orientation . It was predicted that relations-oriented
participants would be more threatened by the evaluation than task-oriented
participants. In order to investigate this hypothesis, a median split was
performed on the Least-Preferred Coworker Scale, and a 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA
was conducted on the self-esteem threat variable, using Dependency
(none,evaluative). Expectation (positive, negative, and Scale Score (bottom
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half, top halo as the independent variables. This analysis did not yield the
predicted effect.
It also was predicted that relations-oriented participants’ perceptions of
the evaluator would be more biased than task-oriented participants’
perceptions. In order to investigate this hypothesis, a median split was
performed on the Least-Preferred Coworker Scale, and 2X2X2 ANOVAs
were conducted on the trait measures, using Dependency (none,evaluative).
Expectation (positive, negative, and Scale Score (bottom half, top halO as the
independent variables. These analyses did not yield the predicted effect.
The trait measures were on the final questionnaire and, as mentioned,
the absence of effects on the final questionnaire may have been due to the
addition of new measures prior to the questionnaire. Furthermore, the new
measures were the measures of state self-esteem and state anxiety. As
discussed, these mediators also did not behave as predicted.
Think-aloud Protocols
For each comment type that was used by at least 10% of the
participants, the number of such comments served as the dependent variable
entered into a 2 X 2 X 2 mixed-model ANOVA on Dependency (none,
evaluative) X Expectation (positive, negative) X Information Valence (positive,
negative).
Discounting . The ANOVA indicated that evaluatively dependent
participants discounted the information more (M = 3.45) than did non-
dependent participants (M = 2.04), F(l,106) = 8.64, MSE = 3.24, p < .005,
replicating previous findings. In addition, a marginal dependency by valence
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interaction, F(l,106)=3.50, MSE = 2.82, ^ = .064, indicated that while both
non-dependent and evaluatively dependent participants discounted more
negative (M = 1.85 and M = 2.98, respectively) than positive (M = 0.18 and
M - 0.47, respectively) information, this difference was much larger for
evaluatively dependent participants (see Figure 2). As found in previous
research, this increased discounting may have been in an effort to interpret
the information about the evaluator in a positive manner.
Mediation
. In addition, self-esteem threat and state anxiety were
predicted to mediate the effect of dependency on impression bias. We already
know that dependency did not predict self-esteem threat or state anxiety.
However, additional analyses indicated that dependency did predict
discounting, 6 =
.27, t(l) = 2.71, p < .05. Further analyses indicated that
neither self-esteem threat nor state anxiety reduced the predictive power of
dependency. Thus, neither self-esteem threat nor state anxiety could be
considered a mediator of the effect of dependency on discounting (Baron &
Kenny, 1986). Once again, the measures of state self-esteem and state anxiety
did not behave as predicted.
Positivity bias . Most of the other significant effects for the comments
were valence effects. The participants seemed more comfortable with the
positive aspects of the other. Participants made more dispositional comments
about the positive information (M = 3.77) than the negative information (M
= 2.30), F(l,106) = 54.42, MSE = 2.19, p < .0001, and more evaluative
comments about the positive information (M = 4.29) than the negative
information (M = 2.40), F(l,106) = 6.95, = 1.03, p < .01.^" On the
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other hand, participants discounted more negative information (M = 2.42)
than positive (M = 0.33), F(l,106) = 85.50, MSE = 2.82, p < .0001. In
addition, participants made more elaborations (many discounting) about the
negative information (M = 4.82) than the positive information (M = 3.15),
F(l,106) = 51.19, MSE = 2.99, p < .0001.“ Similarly, participants made
more attribute connections for the negative information (M = 0.60, mostly
indicating disagreement with positive information) than the positive
information (M = 0.26), F(l,106) = 11.24, MSE = 0.56, p < .005.^2 Finally,
more hedges were made about the negative information (M = 4.19) than the
positive information (M = 3.54), F(l,106) = 9.86, MSE = 2.43, p < .005.^^
These findings seem to indicate that participants preferred to view the other
person in a positive rather than a negative manner. While they discounted,
elaborated, and hedged about the negative information, they preferred to
make dispositional inferences and comment on the valence of the positive
comments.
Inaccuracy
A main effect for expectancy indicated that positive expectancy
participants believed the other person would have more control over the
experimental outcome (M = 6.91) than negative expectancy participants (M =
5.82), F(l,107) = 4.90, MSE = 6.93, p < .05. In an earlier study, Stevens and
Fiske (1995, Experiment 3) reported a similar finding; across dependency
conditions, positive expectancy participants believed the other person would
have more control than negative expectancy participants. In the present
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experiment, this inaccurate perception occurs for both dependency conditions
and appears to reflect wishful thinking by all participants.
Finally, in previous research (Stevens & Fiske, 1995), the elevated level
of discounting, especially of negative information, observed in the evaluated
participants was mirrored by a positivity bias in perceptions of the evaluator’s
traits. In this previous work, while non-dependent perceivers accurately
reported the valence of the other person’s traits, evaluated perceivers inflated
the positivity of the negative evaluator’s traits and equated them with the
traits of the positive evaluator. However, these results were not replicated in
this study. The absence of these effects will be addressed next.
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Table 1. Content Categories for Participants’ Comments
about Target Information
Category Explanation
Disposition Inference about target’s traits, tendencies, likes.
Elaboration Interpretation of what the information means or
implies.
Evaluation Evaluation without interpretation.
Hedging Comment not directed at anything in particular. A
pause filled with "well...uh."
Attribute matching Attempt to match information to prior knowledge of
target.
Repetition Verbatim or paraphrased restatement.
Self-reference Self-comparison, reference to self, opinions.
No comment No comment made or participant says "no
comment."
Discounting Changing the valence of information or providing
an excuse for it.
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CHAPTER 3
DISCUSSION
As anticipated, relative to non-dependent participants, evaluatively
dependent participants spent more time on trait information and discounted
more information, particularly negative information. These findings
substantiate the hypothesis that evaluatively dependent individuals are
motivated to use potentially inaccurate processes to perceive an evaluator self-
protectively (positively). Furthermore, these effects occurred in the context of
an overall positivity bias, across all participants, which was orthogonal to the
dependency effects.
Mediation?
The introduction argued that these biased processes result from the
tremendous loss of control experienced by evaluated perceivers. This loss of
control threatens self-esteem and produces anxiety. In turn, self-esteem
threat and anxiety promote specific, positive biases in evaluated people’s
perceptions of their evaluators (see Figure 1).
However, in the experiment, evaluatively dependent perceivers did not
differ from non-dependent perceivers on measures of perceived control, self-
esteem threat, or anxiety. Even the individual difference measures of trait
self-esteem and relationship orientation did not influence perceivers’ self-
esteem threat or anxiety.
One could argue that the dependency manipulation was not effective;
the evaluation condition was not sufficiently threatening to the experimental
participants. Yet, the same dependency manipulation was used successfully at
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least twice before in the studies on which the theoretical reasoning in this
paper is based (Stevens & Fiske, 1995, Experiments 2 and 3). In fact, in
order to make the evaluation more salient in this study, participants were
informed that they would be receiving their evaluation at the end of the
experimental session.
It is more likely that the absence of effects on the self-esteem threat
and anxiety measures was due to characteristics of the measures themselves.
The jittery-shaky-nervous emotion triad was the seventh of nine emotion
triads. While there were no significant effects on the preceding emotion
triads, participants’ feelings of anxiety could have dissipated as they worked
through the questionnaire items. In addition, the second state self-esteem
scale was embedded in a 26-item scale that has a correlation of .82 with the
Self-Esteem Scale on which the state self-esteem measure was based (Eagly,
1969). Self-esteem effects could have been diluted across these 36 items.
Perhaps these measures need to be refined or disguised in order to yield the
predicted effects.
In any case, these measures were added to the experimental procedure
after the think-aloud portion of the study. As reviewed above, the predicted
effects were present for the think-aloud measures in the study. However, the
addition of these measures seems to have interfered with the hypothesized
effects for the final questionnaire.
Biased Perceptions?
As indicated, while this study replicated the attention and discounting
biases found in the think aloud protocols of previous research (Stevens &
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Fiske, 1995), additional effects were not replicated and new hypotheses were
not confirmed. Based on previous research, it was predicted that an
incompetent other would be inaccurately perceived as competent hy
evaluatively dependent participants. In addition, low self-esteem participants
were hypothesized to desire a incompetent evaluator and task-oriented
participants were hypothesized to be particularly sensitive to the evaluator’s
competency. None of these effects occurred.
These effects may have disappeared because participants were able to
self-affirm via completion of the mood measure or the state self-esteem scale,
which both followed the think-aloud portion of the study. As discussed in the
introduction, self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) argues that information
threatening the perceived adequacy or integrity of the self activates a self-
defensive goal to affirm the general integrity of the self. In order to
accomplish this affirmation, people may adapt to the specific self-throat , may
affirm the broader self-concept , or may affirm a different, but equally
important aspect of the self. The self-esteem and mood measures not only
provided participants with a way to affirm their broader self-concept, but self-
esteem and mood (anxiety) were hypothesized to be the specific self-threat in
this evaluative context. Affirmation would have eliminated the effects of
extreme control deprivation associated with being evaluatively dependent by
restoring an efficacious self-image. Thus, the predicted perceived control and
trait effects disappeared.
Proposed Study
Because the perceived control and trait effects did disappear after the
opportunity to self-affirm on mood or self-esteem measures, it appears as
though self-esteem or mood is important in an evaluative context. However,
we also know from this study that measures of mood and state self-esteem are
sensitive measures. It would be advantageous to conduct a study in which
only half of the participants are given the opportunity to complete the mood
and state self-esteem measures. If findings from the Stevens and Fiske (1995)
study are replicated by the participants who do not complete the mood and
state self-esteem measures, while the participants who do complete the mood
and state self-esteem measures mirror the participants in this study, we will
know a little more about how mood and self-esteem affect the use of biased
processes of impression formation.
In conclusion, this research on how evaluated powerless people form
impressions of their evaluators does indicate that people are motivated
tacticians who take their goals into account before choosing strategies;
evaluatively dependent people choose different strategies than non-dependent
people. Furthermore, we know that some strategies can be directionally
biased; evaluated people use positively biased strategies. However, most
significantly, this research reveals how much we do not know about the
underlying forces that guide these motivated tacticians.
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appendix a
SELF-ESTEEM SCALE (TRAIT)
!?!!!!
indicate the extent to which you agree with eachof the following statements on the scan sheet.
0 Strongly Disagree 1 = Disagree 2 = Agree 3 = Strongly Agree
1. I feel that I’m person of worth, at least on equal basis with others.
2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
3. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.
6. I take a positive attitude toward myself.
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself.
9. I certainly feel useless at times.
10. At times, I think I am no good at all.
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APPENDIX B
LEAST-PREFERRED COWORKER SCALE
People differ in the ways the think about those with whom they workThis may be important in working with others. Please give your immediate,
first reaction to the following items.
everyone with whom you have ever worked on a common
task. Now, pick out the person with whom you work least wpII This person
may be someone you work with now, or may be someone you knew in the
past.
This person does not have to be the person you like least well, but
should be the person with whom you had the most difficulty in getting a job
done. Describe this person as he/she appears to you.
Look at the words at both ends of the line before you decide upon your
answer. Please remember that there are no right or wrong answers
. Work
rapidly; your first answer is likely to be the best. Please do not omit any
items. Fill in the bubble on the scan sheet for the one number you have
chosen for each item.
pleasant 01234567 unpleasant
friendly 01234567 unfriendly
rejecting 01234567 accepting
tense 01234567 relaxed
distant 01234567 close
cold 01234567 warm
supportive 01234567 hostile
boring 01234567 interesting
quarrelsome 01234567 harmonious
gloomy 01234567 cheerful
open 01234567 guarded
backbiting 01234567 loyal
untrustworthy 01234567 trustworthy
considerate 01234567 inconsiderate
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nasty 01234567 nice
agreeable 01234567 disagreeable
insincere 01234567 sincere
kind 01234567 unkind
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APPENDIX C
SELF-ESTEEM SCALE (STATE)
V? Remember, your answers arecompletely confidential.
with otWs^’
^ ^ ^
1 Strongly Agree 2 Agree 3 Disagree 4 Strongly Disagree
2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities at this moment.
1 Strongly Agree 2 Agree 3 Disagree 4 Strongly Disagree
3. Right now, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.
1 Strongly Agree 2 Agree 3 Disagree 4 Strongly Disagree
4. At this moment, I feel that I do not have much to be proud of.
1 Strongly Agree 2 Agree 3 Disagree 4 Strongly Disagree
5. At this moment, I think I am able to do things as well as most people.
1 Strongly Agree 2 Agree 3 Disagree 4 Strongly Disagree
6. Right now, I take a positive attitude toward myself.
1 Strongly Agree 2 Agree 3 Disagree 4 Strongly Disagree
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself at this moment.
1 Strongly Agree 2 Agree 3 Disagree 4 Strongly Disagree
8. Currently, I wish I could have more respect for myself.
1 Strongly Agree 2 Agree 3 Disagree 4 Strongly Disagree
9. I certainly feel useless at this moment.
1 Strongly Agree 2 Agree 3 Disagree 4 Strongly Disagree
10. Currently, I think I am no good at all.
1 Strongly Agree 2 Agree 3 Disagree 4 Strongly Disagree
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APPENDIX D
STIMULI FOR EXPERIMENT
SontGricGs Consistent with Compotoncp
I thought the TA had just the right amount of persistence when trying to
relate an idea to the class.
The TA was efficient and usually got the homework graded way ahead of
time.
I thought the TA sometimes had yery clever answers to questions.
The TA appeared to be relaxed during teaching.
I liked how quickly the TA went through the material without omitting any
important points.
Sentences Consistent with Incompetence
I thought the TA was sort of yague when explaining things.
The TA was sloppy and had illegible handwriting.
From the amount of preparation and the level of organization, I would say
that the TA was an irresponsible instructor.
The TA took a superficial approach to teaching, not showing a lot of interest
in the participant.
In the discussion section, the TA spent a lot of time nitpicking at minor
details.
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APPENDIX E
EPSTEIN’S EMOTION TRIADS
Please indicate how you feel right now by circling a number for each of the
following groups of emotions:
not at all very much
happy, cheerful,
OR joyous
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
angry, irritated,
OR annoyed
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
unhappy, sad,
OR gloomy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
frightened, worried,
OR threatened
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
energetic, aroused,
OR keyed-up
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
tired, weary,
OR unreactive
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Jittery, shaky,
OR nervous
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
calm, relaxed,
OR at ease
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
enthusiastic, alive,
OR alert
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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APPENDIX F
SELF-ESTEEM SCALE (STATE) WITHIN
FEELINGS OF INADEQUACY SCALE
Please indicate how you feel right now. Remember, your answers are
completely confidential.
1. Right now, do you feel inferior to most of the people you know?
definitely no XXXXXXX definitely yes
2. At this moment, do you worry about criticisms that might be made of your
work?
definitely no XXX XXXX definitely yes
3. Right now, do feel you are able to do things as well as most people?
definitely no XXXXXXX definitely yes
4. If you had to read an essay and understand it at this moment, would you
feel worried or concerned about it?
definitely no XXXXXXX definitely yes
5. At this moment, do you feel confident that someday the people you know
will look up to you and respect you?
definitely no XXXXXXX definitely yes
6. Currently, do you feel self-conscious?
definitely no XXXXXXX definitely yes
7. Do you certainly feel useless at this moment?
definitely no XXXXXXX definitely yes
8. At this moment, do you think you would have trouble thinking of the right
things to talk about if you were in a group?
definitely no XXXXXXX definitely yes
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argument to convince someone, who maygr your ideas, would you feel concerned or worried about it?it?
X X definitely yes
definitely no X X X X X
10. Currently, do you think you are no good at all?
definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes
peoptV’’'^
moment, do you worry about how well you get along with other
definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes
12. Do you think that you are a worthless individual at this moment?
definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes
13. Currently, do you feel afraid or anxious about going into a room by
yourself where other people have already gathered and are talking?
definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes
14. Do you feel that you have a number of good qualities at this moment?
definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes
15. Currently, would you have trouble expressing your ideas if you tried to
put them into writing?
definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes
16. Right now, do you worry about whether other people will regard you as a
success or failure?
definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes
17. Currently, do you wish you could have more respect for yourself?
definitely no XXXXXXX definitely yes
18. Currently, do you feel so discouraged with yourself that you wonder
whether you are a worthwhile person?
definitely no XXXXXXX definitely yes
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scholastic ability than
definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes
20. At this moment, would you feel uncomfortable meeting new people?
definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes
21. Right now, are you inclined to feel that you are a failure?
definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes
22. Right now, do you dislike yourself?
definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes
23. Are you troubled with shyness at this moment?
definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes
24. Right now, do you take a positive attitude toward yourself?
definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes
25. If you turned in a major assignment right now, would you feel you did an
excellent job on it?
definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes
26. Do you feel worried or bothered about what other people think about you
at this moment?
definitely no XXXXXXX definitely yes
27. Right now, if you made an embarrassing mistake or did something that
makes you look foolish, would it take you a long time to get over it?
definitely no XXXXXXX definitely yes
28. Are you satisfied with yourself at the moment?
definitely no XXXXXXX definitely yes
29. Right now, do you feel confident about your abilities?
definitely no XXXXXXX definitely yes
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worried about whether other people like to be with
definitely no ^ ^ ^ ^ X X definitely yes
31.
Currently, do you feel that you are a person of worth, at least
equal basis with others.
on an
definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes
32. Right now, would you have trouble understanding things you read?
definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes
33. Right now, if you thought that some of the people you meet might have
an unfavorable opinion of you, would you feel concerned or worried about it?
definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes
34. Currently, do you have the feeling that there is nothing you can do well?
definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes
35. At this moment, do you feel you do not have much to be proud of?
definitely no X X X X X X X definitely yes
36. Currently, compared with classmates, do you feel you must study more
than they do to get the same grades?
definitely no XXXXXXX definitely yes
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APPENDIX G
EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE
Part I
Please answer the following questions honestly. Your answers are completely
confidential.
How well do you think you will do on the task?
not very well 123456789 10 11 very well
How well does the work-study person expect to do in the discussion?
not very well 12345 6789 10 11 very well
How much control do you feel you will have over your outcomes in this
experiment?
very little 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11a lot
How much control do you feel the work-study student will have over your
outcomes in this experiment?
very little 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 a lot
You have received some information about the work-study person with whom
you will discuss your ideas. Do you think this information will be helpful?
not very 123456789 10 11 very helpful
helpful
If you were participating in this experiment again, would you like:
less info 123456789 10 11 more info
about the the same about the
work-study amount work-study
How inconsistent or consistent was the information you received about the
work-study student?
very 123456789 10 11 very
inconsistent consistent
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information you received about the work-
very 123456789
positive
How unclear or clear is your impression of the
10 11 very
negative
work-study person?
very unclear 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 very
Does the work-study person seem:
Competent,
not very 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 very
Likable.
not very 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 very
Lazy.
not very 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 very
Outgoing,
not very 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 very
Honest.
not very 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 very
Friendly.
not very 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 very
Irresponsible,
not very 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 very
Loyal.
not very 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 very
Hard-working,
not very 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 very
Nervous.
not very 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 very
How happy or unhappy do you feel about having this person as the person
you’ll be discussing your ideas with?
very 123456789 10 11 very
happy unhappy
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Who will be evaluating your performance in order to give away the prizes?
What kind of things do you think will
and in the evaluation?
influence how well you do on the task
Part II
Based on what you remember from the explanation given earlier, please
briMly describe what you are getting ready to work on.
We are always interested in any comments, ideas, questions, or predictions
people have about our studies. If you have any, please describe them below.
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ENDNOTES
The six deleted participants were distributed across conditions: Four
were in the no dependency-positive expectancy condition, none were in the no
dependency-negative expectancy condition, one was in the evaluative
dependency-positive expectancy condition, and one was in the evaluative
dependency-negative expectancy condition.
The Feelings of Inadequacy Scale simply was used to disguise the
second presentation of the State Self-Esteem Scale and will not be discussed
in any further.
^ Only those questionnaire items that yielded significant effects are
discussed in the results section.
Five additional expectancy main effects also served as manipulation
checks. Participants expecting a positive other indicated that the information
they received was less negative (M =4.75) than participants expecting a
negative other (M = 6.29), F(l,107) = 16.46, MSE = 3.99, p < .0005.
Participants expecting a positive other also rated the other more competent
(M = 7.47), more likable (M = 7.33), more outgoing (M = 6.98), and less
nervous (M = 3.56) than participants expecting a negative other (M = 5.91,
M =6.66, M = 5.45, and M = 6.91, respectively), F(l,107) = 18.13, MSE =
3.71, p < .0001, F(l,107) = 4.55, = 2.67, p < .05, F(l,107) = 23.66,
MSE = 2.78, p < .0005, F(l,107) = 61.07, = 5.07, p < .0001,
respectively.
^ A valence by expectation interaction indicated that participants who
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expected the other to be positive had a larger difference between time spent
on negative (M = 76.02) and positive (M = 61.19) information than
participants who expected the other to be negative (negative M = 73.29,
positive M = 66.04), F(l,106) = 5.49, MSE = 145.90, p < .05.
Other operationalizations of self-esteem threat were investigated and
the results of those analyses did not differ from the presented analyses.
’ Using only the discounting comments made about negative information
did not affect the results.
® A measure of trait anxiety also was available from the prescreening
questionnaire. Although no hypotheses were made about trait anxiety,
exploratory analyses were conducted. None of these analyses yielded any
meaningful effects.
^ Moderator effects were also investigated using regression analyses and
the results did not differ from those of the ANOVAs.
Participants expecting a positive other also seemed more comfortable
commenting on the valence of the information; they made more evaluative
comments (M = 4.29) than participants expecting a negative other (M =
2.40), F(l,106) = 6.95, = 7.05, p < .01.
More elaborations were made by evaluative participants (M = 9.29)
than by non-dependent participants (M = 6.64), F(l,106) = 5.20, MSE =
18.51, p < .05. Furthermore, a dependency by valence interaction indicated
that while both non-dependent and evaluatively dependent participants both
made more elaborations about the negative information (M = 3.87 and M =
5.76, respectively) than the positive information (M = 2.76 and M = 3.53,
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respectively), this difference was larger for evaluatively dependent
participants, F(l,106) = 5.92, MSE = 2.99, p < .05. Once again, many of
these elaborations were also discounting comments.
In addition, two main effects indicated that evaluatively dependent
participants (M = 0.58) made more attribute connections than non-dependent
participants (M = 0.28), F(l,106) = 6.17, MSE = 0.83, p < .05, and that
participants expecting a positive fictitious other (M = 0.57) made more
attribute connections than participants expecting a negative fictitious other
(M — 0.29), F(l,106) = 5.47, MSE = 0.83, p < .05. Again, in these
statements, participants highlighted the negative information’s disagreement
with the positive information. Both participants expecting a positive fictitious
other and participants being evaluated appeared to have positive expectations
for the other person.
An expectation by valence interaction indicated that the same number
of hedges about the positive information were made by participants expecting
a positive other and participants expecting a negative other (M = 3.45 and M
= 3.62, respectively). However, participants expecting a positive other made
many more hedges about the negative information (M = 4.71) than
participants expecting a negative other (M = 3.67), F(l,106) = 8.27, MSE =
2.43, p < .005. Participants expecting a positive other may have been
surprised unpleasantly by the negative information.
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